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Abstract	  
This	   paper	   explores	   how	   the	   passage	   of	   Saskatchewan’s	   Health	   Facilities	  
Licensing	  Act	  in	  1996	  created	  both	  a	  legal	  framework	  for	  private	  health	  facilities	  
in	  the	  province	  as	  well	  as	  erecting	  significant	  barriers	  to	  virtually	  insure	  that	  no	  
such	   facilities	   could	   effectively	   operate.	   This	   is	   done	   within	   the	   context	   of	  
discovering	  how	  placing	  barriers	  to	  privatization	  has	  contributed	  to	  reform	  of	  the	  
health	  care	  system	  and	  the	  conditions	   in	  which	  reform	  will	  be	  permitted.	   	  Data	  
for	   the	   study	   were	   collected	   from	   a	   series	   of	   eleven	   key	   informant	   interviews	  
including	   elected	   officials,	   civil	   servants,	   health	   care	   professionals,	   academics,	  
members	   of	   key	   stakeholder	   organizations	  which	   both	   supported	  and	  opposed	  
the	  legislation.	  
Introduction	  
One	  would	   be	   hard	   pressed	   to	   find	   a	   single	   issue	   that	   is	  more	   divisive	  within	   the	   health	   care	  
debate	   than	   that	   of	   the	   role	   of	   private	   financing	   and	   private	   delivery	   of	   health	   services.	   	   But	  
despite	   a	   number	   of	   	   wide-­‐ranging	   provincial	   studies	   (see,	   for	   example:	   Quebec,	   2000;	  
Saskatchewan,	   2001;	   Alberta,	   2002),	   a	   Royal	   Commission	   (Canada,	   2002a)	   and	   a	   Senate	  
committee	  report	  (Canada,	  2002b)	  in	  the	  past	  decade,	  there	  is	  also	  probably	  no	  single	  issue	  that	  
is	  still	  so	  poorly	  understood	  by	  the	  public,	  stakeholders	  and	  governments.	  	  The	  recent	  Supreme	  
Court	   decision	   that	   found	   Quebec’s	   ban	   on	   the	   purchase	   of	   private	   insurance	   for	   services	  
already	  insured	  under	  provincial	  insurance	  to	  be	  a	  violation	  of	  the	  Quebec	  Charter	  of	  Rights	  has	  
reignited	  the	  debate	   in	   important	  ways	  while	  also	  doing	   little	  to	  clarify	  some	  of	  the	  key	   issues	  
that	  are	  stake	  (Marchildon,	  2005;	  Flood	  et	  al.,	  2005;	  McIntosh,	  2006;	  Premont,	  2007).	  The	  reality	  
is	  that,	   like	  many	  health	  services	  themselves,	  the	  private	  sector	  has	  different	  roles	   in	  different	  
provinces.	  	  While	  Quebec	  had	  legislated	  a	  complete	  ban	  on	  the	  purchase	  of	  insurance	  for	  those	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services	   already	   covered,	   some	   other	   provinces	   have	   no	   such	   legislation.	   This	   includes	  
Saskatchewan	  which	  prides	   itself	   on	  being	   ‘the	  birthplace	  of	  medicare’.	   	   Some	  provinces	   (e.g.	  
British	   Columbia	   and	   Alberta)	   have	   already	   allowed	   significant	   growth	   in	   private	   for-­‐profit	  
facilities	   that	   offer	   everything	   from	   advanced	   diagnostic	   testing	   to	   a	   range	   of	   surgical	  
procedures.	  	  Some	  of	  these	  initiatives	  have	  been	  actively	  encouraged	  by	  provincial	  governments	  
while	  others	  have	  been	  tolerated	  or	  quietly	  encouraged	  insofar	  as	  they	  are	  deemed	  as	  providing	  
a	  ‘release	  valve’	  for	  the	  pressures	  on	  the	  publicly	  financed	  system.	  	  	  
What	   is	   at	   issue,	   here,	   has	   less	   to	   do	   with	   the	   delivery	   of	   health	   services,	   but,	   rather	   the	  
financing	  or	  payment	  for	  those	  services.	   	  Much	  of	  health	  care	   in	  Canada	   is	  privately	  delivered.	  	  
General	  practitioners	  or	  family	  physicians	  along	  with	  a	  host	  of	  other	  health	  providers	  operate	  as	  
private	   deliverers	   of	   health	   services	   to	   their	   patients.	   	  What	  makes	   the	   Canadian	   health	   care	  
system	  ‘public’	   is	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  those	  private	  deliverers	  of	  care	  are	  paid	  from	  the	  public	  
purse.	   	   The	   Canadian	   system	   is	   characterized,	   in	   Naylor’s	   succinct	   phrase,	   as	   one	   of	   “private	  
practice,	  public	  payment”	  (Naylor,	  2003).	  
This	   is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  the	  private	  delivery	  of	  health	  care	  does	  not	  raise	   important	  and	  serious	  
questions.	  	  As	  Deber	  (2004)	  has	  noted,	  private	  delivery	  can	  come	  in	  many	  forms.	  	  There	  may	  be	  
little	   concern	   about	   a	   single	   or	   multi-­‐physician	   primary	   care	   clinic	   as	   a	   threat	   to	   the	   ‘public’	  
nature	   of	   Canadian	  medicare,	   but	   there	  may	   very	   significant	   concern	   about	   a	   publicly	   traded	  
corporation	   with	   a	   fiduciary	   duty	   to	   maximize	   profit	   operating	   a	   Canadian	   hospital.	   The	  
important	  distinction	  in	  Canada	  is	  less	  about	  public	  versus	  private	  than	  it	  is	  about	  not-­‐for-­‐profit	  
and	  for-­‐profit	  delivery.	   	  To	  the	  extent	  that	  hospitals	  remain	  private	   institutions	   in	  Canada	  (and	  
this	  is	  debatable	  in	  those	  provinces	  that	  have	  regionalized	  systems)	  they	  are	  almost	  always	  not-­‐
for-­‐profit	   institutions	  operating	  under	  mandates	  determined	  by	  governments	  both	   legislatively	  
and	  through	  funding	  arrangements	  (Fuller,	  1998;	  Armstrong	  and	  Armstrong,	  2003;	  Deber,	  2004)	  	  
But	  it	   is	  confusion	  between	  private	  delivery	  and	  private	  payment	  that	  muddies	  so	  much	  of	  the	  
debate	   around	   the	   role	   of	   the	   private	   sector	   in	   Canadian	   health	   care.	   	  When	   politicians	   and	  
activists	  rail	  against	  private	  health	  care’s	  erosion	  of	  the	  public	  system,	  it	  is	  not,	  one	  assumes,	  the	  
private	   primary	   care	   clinic	   that	   is	   their	   target.	   	   Rather	   they	   are	   concerned	   with	   the	   growing	  
reliance	  on	  private	  payment	  to	  insure	  access	  to	  necessary	  services,	  especially	  when	  a	  patient	  is	  
waiting	   for	   those	   services.	   	   When	   private	   MRI	   clinics	   allow	   patients	   to	   get	   diagnostic	   tests	  
without	  waiting	  in	  a	  public	  queue	  those	  patients	  can	  receive	  faster	  treatment	  by	  virtue	  of	  their	  
ability	  to	  pay	  out-­‐of-­‐pocket	  for	  the	  diagnostic	  test.	  	  Thus,	  the	  length	  of	  their	  wait	  for	  a	  medically	  
necessary	   service	   is	   not	   determined	   by	   their	   need	   but	   by	   their	   ability	   to	   pay	   for	   privately	  
delivered	  services.ii	  
Such	  facilities,	  including	  those	  that	  offer	  a	  growing	  range	  of	  surgical	  procedures,	  operate	  under	  
different	  legal	  and	  regulatory	  rules	  in	  each	  province	  (Marchildon,	  2007:	  61-­‐71).	  	  While	  they	  are	  
all	   private-­‐for-­‐profit	   facilities,	   they	   are	   operated	   by	   health	   providers	   who	   are	   themselves	  
regulated	   by	   their	   profession	   and,	   as	   far	   as	   the	   delivery	   of	   health	   services	   in	   concerned,	   no	  
different	   than	   a	   private	   medical	   practice	   operated	   by	   a	   licensed	   physician	   (Deber,	   2004).	  	  
However,	   the	   presence	   of	   clinics	   with	   non-­‐health	   professional	   investors	   (e.g.	   shareholders)	  
raises	  exactly	  the	  concerns	  expressed	  by	  Deber	   in	  terms	  of	  the	  conflict	  between	  the	   investors’	  
desire	  for	  profit	  maximization	  and	  the	  physicians’	  responsibility	  for	  the	  provision	  of	  appropriate	  
care.	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But,	  on	  the	  financing	  side,	  they	  often	  rely	  on	  a	  mix	  of	  both	  private	  and	  public	  payment	  in	  order	  
to	   continue	  operation.	   	  A	  private	   clinic	  offering	  MRI	   scans	  may	  have	  a	   contract	  with	   the	   local	  
regional	   health	   authority	   (RHA)	   to	   provide	   services	   for	   which	   the	   clinic	   is	   paid	   on	   a	   fee-­‐for-­‐
service	  basis	  out	  of	  public	   funds	  by	   the	  RHA	  while	  also	  offering	   the	  same	  service	   to	   individual	  
patients	   (perhaps	   from	  other	  provinces)	  who	  pay	  either	  directly	  out-­‐of-­‐pocket	  or	  with	  private	  
insurance.	   	   That	   same	   clinic	   may	   also	   receive	   a	   significant	   portion	   of	   their	   revenue	   from	   a	  
provincial	  Workers’	  Compensation	  plan	  that,	  despite	  being	  a	  public	  agency,	  has	  the	  authority	  to	  
use	   its	  resources	  to	  speed	  treatment	  for	   injured	  workers	  so	  that	  they	  can	  return	  to	  the	   labour	  
market	  more	  quickly	  (Canada,	  2002a:	  8,	  64;	  Gildiner,	  2006).	  
It	  is	  this	  mix	  of	  public	  and	  private	  payment	  –	  combined	  with	  the	  promise	  of	  ‘faster’	  and	  ‘better’	  
service	   –	   that	   is	   seen	   as	   the	   threat	   to	   the	   notion	   of	   access	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   need	   rather	   than	  
ability	   to	   pay	   that	   lies	   at	   the	   heart	   of	   the	   Canadian	  model	   of	   health	   care.	   	   Does	   allowing	   the	  
private	   purchase	   of	  medically	   necessary	   insured	   services	   provide	   a	   ‘safety	   valve’	   for	   an	   over-­‐
burdened	  public	  system?	  	  Or	  does	  it	  constitute	  a	  significant	  erosion	  of	  the	  principles	  of	  medicare	  
that	  undermines	  the	  public	  system	  by	  siphoning	  resources	  away	  from	  the	  system	   in	  a	  manner	  
that	  will	  only	  further	  entrench	  health	  inequities	  across	  the	  country.	  	  	  
Different	   provinces	   have	   responded	   in	   different	   ways	   to	   the	   regulation	   of	   private	   health	  
facilities.	  	  This	  study	  focuses	  on	  the	  unique	  response	  of	  the	  government	  of	  Saskatchewan,	  which	  
passed	   legislation	  governing	   the	   licensing	  of	  private	  health	   facilities	   in	  1996.	   	  What	  makes	   the	  
response	  unique	  is	  the	  fact	  that	  while	  the	  legislation	  provides	  a	  clear	  process	  for	  the	  approval,	  
licensing	  and	  regulation	  of	  such	  facilities,	   it	   imposes	  a	  set	  of	  rules	  that	  would,	   in	  all	   likelihood,	  
render	  such	  facilities	  unable	  to	  make	  a	  profit	  for	  their	  operators.	  	  The	  Health	  Facilities	  Licensing	  
Act,	  1996	  	  (HFLA)	  relies	  on	  a	  very	  strict	  separation	  between	  facilities	  that	  receive	  funds	  from	  the	  
public	   purse	   and	   those	   that	   receive	   private	   revenue	   and	   does	   not	   allow	   facility	   operators	   to	  
receive	   revenue	   from	   both.	   	   Private	   facilities	   must	   receive	   all	   revenue	   from	   private	   sources	  
(either	   out-­‐of-­‐pocket	   payments	   by	   individuals	   or	   from	   private	   insurance)	   and	   limits	   those	  
facilities	  to	  charging	  for	  services	  at	  the	  same	  rate	  as	  the	  public	  fee-­‐schedule	  used	  to	  reimburse	  
physicians	  and	  other	  providers.	  
The	  purpose	  of	  this	  paper	  is	  to	  gain	  an	  understanding	  of	  why	  this	  legislation	  was	  implemented	  in	  
Saskatchewan	  and	  why	  it	  creates	  barriers	  to	  opening	  a	  private	  facility.	   	  This	   is	  done	  within	  the	  
context	   of	   discovering	   how	   placing	   barriers	   to	   privatization	   has	   contributed	   to	   reform	   of	   the	  
health	   care	   system	  and	   the	   conditions	   in	  which	   reform	  will	   be	  permitted.	   	  Data	   for	   the	   study	  
were	  collected	  from	  a	  series	  of	  eleven	  key	  informant	  interviews	  including	  elected	  officials,	  civil	  
servants,	   health	   care	   professionals,	   academics,	   members	   of	   the	   Radiology	   Associates	   of	  
Saskatchewan	   (RAS),	   members	   of	   the	   College	   of	   Physicians	   and	   Surgeons	   of	   Saskatchewan	  
(CPSS)	   and	   members	   of	   the	   Saskatchewan	  Medical	   Association	   (SMA).	   	   All	   participants	   were	  
affected	   in	   some	  way	  by	   the	  Act:	   some	  because	  of	   an	   interest	  due	   to	  professional	   status	   and	  
others	  because	  of	  their	  involvement	  in	  the	  policy	  process.	  	  	  
As	  will	   be	   discussed	   in	  more	   detail	   below,	   the	   rationale	   for	   this	   particular	   legislative	   action	   is	  
multifaceted.	  	  In	  part	  it	  was	  driven	  by	  political	  considerations.	  	  The	  series	  of	  reforms	  instituted	  
by	   the	  New	  Democratic	   Party	   (NDP)	   government	  of	  Roy	  Romanow	   in	   the	  early	   1990s	   created	  
significant	   upheaval	   in	   the	   system	   and	   appeared	   driven	   by,	   at	   times,	   competing	   agendas	  
(Adams,	  2000;	  McIntosh	  and	  Marchildon,	  2009).	  	  Regionalization,	  the	  closure	  and	  conversion	  of	  
fifty	   facilities	   in	   smaller	   communities,	   a	   renewed	   focus	   on	   health	   promotion	   and	   disease	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prevention	   and	   cuts	   to	   the	   provincial	   drug	   plan	   had	   champions	   and	   critics	   both	   inside	   and	  
outside	  of	  the	  NDP’s	  political	  base.	  	  From	  this	  perspective,	  legislation	  limiting	  the	  role	  of	  private	  
facilities	   within	   the	   province	   shored	   up	   the	   government’s	   position	   as	   a	   defender	   of	   Tommy	  
Douglas’	  legacy.	  
At	  the	  same	  time,	  there	  is	  evidence	  that	  within	  the	  government	  caucus	  and	  cabinet	  there	  was	  a	  
perception	   that	   the	   liberalization	   of	   trade	   in	   goods	   and	   services	   represented	   by	   the	   North	  
American	  Free	  Trade	  Agreement	  (NAFTA)	  and	  the	  Agreement	  on	  Internal	  Trade	  (AIT)	  required	  a	  
regulatory	  and	  legislative	  response	  that	  would	  clarify	  the	  terms	  and	  conditions	  of	  any	  potential	  
private	   sector	   investment	   in	  health	   service	  delivery.	   	   Finally,	   the	   lack	  of	   focused	  opposition	   to	  
the	   government’s	   legislative	   move	   (either	   from	   within	   the	   legislature	   where	   the	   Official	  
Opposition	   was	   going	   through	   its	   own	   political	   transformation	   or	   from	   interests	   outside	   the	  
legislative	   process)	  meant	   the	   legislation	   itself	  went	   virtually	   unnoticed	   by	   the	   public	   and	   the	  
media.	  
The	   result,	   then,	   is	   the	   creation	  of	   a	   legislative	   and	   regulatory	   framework	   that,	   depending	  on	  
one’s	   perspective,	   can	   be	   described	   as	   either	   a	   principled	   defense	   of	   a	   publicly	   financed	   and	  
administered	   health	   care	   system	   or	   as	   a	   cynical	   and	   disingenuous	   move	   to	   stifle	   meaningful	  
reform	   of	   a	   failing	   system.	   The	   HFLA	   uses	   the	   very	   rhetoric	   of	   the	   potential	   threat	   of	  
privatization	  to	  marginalize	  any	  threat	  that	  private	  facilities	  might	  pose	  to	  the	  public	  health	  care	  
system	  by	   requiring	   such	   facilities	   to	  be	   fully	   private	   in	   their	   financing	   and	  operation.	   	   Rather	  
than	   ban	   such	   facilities	   out-­‐right,	   the	   legislation	   forces	   them	   to	   operate	   entirely	   without	   any	  
public	   funds	  (including	  WCB	  cases)	  or	  access	  to	  publicly	  provided	   infrastructure.	   	   In	  this	  sense,	  
the	  legislation	  forces	  private	  clinics	  to	  truly	  demonstrate	  that	  ‘private	  is	  better’	  by	  refusing	  them	  
any	  public	  subsidy	  whatsoever.	  	  Thus,	  any	  facility	  that	  would	  be	  licensed	  under	  the	  HFLA	  would	  
likely	  be	  unprofitable	  for	  its	  investors	  given	  the	  limited	  market	  that	  exists	  in	  Saskatchewan.	  	  And	  
that	   raises	   interesting	   questions	   about	   the	   extent	   to	   which	   the	   private	   facilities	   operating	   in	  
other	  jurisdictions	  rely,	  in	  fact,	  on	  what	  could	  be	  considered	  a	  de	  facto	  public	  subsidy	  in	  order	  to	  
turn	   a	   profit.	   	   Answers	   to	   such	   questions	   could	   change	   the	   terms	   of	   debate	   over	   private	  
financing	  in	  the	  future.	  
The	  Health	  Facilities	  Licensing	  Act:	  Context	  and	  Content	  
The	  1996	  passage	  of	   the	  Health	  Facilities	  Licensing	  Act	   (HFLA)	  came	  after	   five	  years	  of	  budget	  
cuts,	   facility	   closures	   and	   changes	   to	   the	   health	   care	   system	   that	   saw	   a	   restructuring	   of	   the	  
governance	  philosophy,	   infrastructure	  and	  funding	  formulae.	   	  The	  early	  years	  of	  the	  Romanow	  
government,	   first	   elected	   in	   1991,	   were	  marked	   by	   significant	   fiscal	   restraint	   as	   the	   province	  
inherited	   a	   $14B	   debt	   from	   its	   Conservative	   predecessors.	   	   On	   the	   health	   care	   front	   the	  
government	   felt	   compelled	   to	   scale	   back	   the	   province’s	   generous	   public	   drug	   plan	   by	  
significantly	  raising	  deductibles	  and	  by	  closing	  or	  converting	  50	  small	  rural	  hospitals	   (McIntosh	  
and	  Marchildon,	  2009:	  338-­‐340).	  
Yet,	   at	   the	   same	   time,	   the	   Romanow	   government	   launched	   an	   ambitious	   health	   care	   reform	  
agenda	  meant	  to	  modernize	  the	  governance,	  financing	  and	  delivery	  of	  health	  care.	  	  Independent	  
hospital	   and	   facility	   boards	  were	   replaced	  with	  Health	  Districts	   charged	  with	   the	  organization	  
and	   coordination	   of	   service	   delivery	   across	   32	   geographic	   regions	   in	   the	   provinceiii.	   	   Health	  
District	  funding	  was	  based	  on	  the	  implementation	  of	  a	  new	  formula	  meant	  to	  take	  into	  account	  
the	   health	   needs	   of	   the	   population	   being	   served	   (McIntosh,	   Ducie	   et	   al.,	   2009)	   and	   District	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boards	   were	   charged	   with	   reorienting	   the	   delivery	   of	   services	   towards	   health	   promotion,	  
disease	   prevention	   and	   population	   health	   goals.	   	   Further,	   the	   government	   pushed	   for	   new	  
primary	   health	   care	   delivery	  models	   based	   on	   interdisciplinary	   teams	   of	   providers	   that	   could	  
care	   for	   patients	   across	   the	   full	   continuum	  of	   care	  needs	   and	   lessen	   the	   reliance	  on	  hospital-­‐
based	  care	  (McIntosh	  and	  Marchildon,	  2009:	  339-­‐342).	  
Whatever	   the	   success	   of	   the	   Romanow	   reforms,	   and	   the	   successes	   were	   real	   (Lazar	   et	   al.,	  
forthcoming),	   they	   were	   also	   exhausting	   for	   the	   government	   and	   the	   public.	   	   The	   Romanow	  
health	  policy	  agenda	  was	  curiously	  bifurcated.	  	  On	  the	  one	  hand	  there	  were	  the	  cuts	  to	  health	  
and	   social	   services	   driven	   by	   an	   impending	   fiscal	   crisis	   within	   the	   province	   (which	   would	   be	  
exacerbated	  by	  cuts	  in	  federal	  transfers	  following	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  Canada	  Health	  and	  Social	  
Transfer	  (CHST)	   in	  the	  1996/97	  fiscal	  year)	  (Canada,	  2002a:	  313)	  and	  the	  closure	  of	  facilities	   in	  
rural	   Saskatchewan.	   	   On	   the	   other	   hand	  was	   the	   proactive	   health	   reform	   program	   –	   primary	  
health	  care,	  regionalization	  and	  needs-­‐based	  funding,	  alternative	  funding	  for	  physician	  services,	  
etc.	  –	  all	  falling	  under	  the	  rubric	  of	  the	  “wellness	  agenda”.	  	  	  
By	  the	  mid-­‐point	  of	  Romanow’s	  second	  term	  in	  office,	  the	  public	  was	  simultaneously	  supportive,	  
confused	  and	  angry	  over	  the	  future	  of	  health	  care	   in	  the	  province.	   	  The	  theoretical	  outlines	  of	  
the	  wellness	  agenda	  garnered	  significant	  support	  for	  its	  emphasis	  on	  prevention	  and	  population	  
health	   outcomes,	   support	   that	   would	   be	   echoed	   on	   a	   national	   scale	   a	   few	   years	   later	   in	   the	  
‘citizens’	   dialogues’	   conducted	   by	   the	   Romanow	   Commission	   (Canada,	   2002a;	  Maxwell	   et	   al.,	  
2002).	  	  But	  anger	  and	  confusion	  emanated	  from	  the	  decision	  to	  close	  and/or	  convert	  small	  rural	  
facilities	  and	   the	  elimination	  or	  down-­‐grading	  of	   some	  services.	   	   From	  the	   left,	   critics	   saw	   the	  
wellness	  agenda	  as	  a	  smokescreen	  for	  budget-­‐cutting	  and	  neo-­‐liberal	  restraint.	  	  From	  the	  right,	  
the	  agenda	  failed	  to	  seriously	  take	  on	  the	  so-­‐called	  fiscal	  sustainability	   issues	  that	  plagued	  the	  
system.	  	  	  
Beyond	  the	  internal	  dynamics	  of	  the	  province,	  national	  and	  international	  developments	  focused	  
attention	   on	   the	   role	   of	   both	   private	   delivery	   and	   private	   financing	   of	   health	   care	   services.	  	  
Trade	   liberalization	   agreements,	   both	   national	   (the	   AIT)	   and	   international	   (NAFTA,	  WTO),	   not	  
only	  proliferated	  but	  expanded	  in	  scope	  in	  the	  mid-­‐	  to	  late-­‐1990s.	  	  No	  longer	  focused	  exclusively	  
on	   liberalizing	   trade	   in	   goods,	   such	   agreements	   increasingly	   focused	   on	   trade	   in	   services	   as	   a	  
reflection	  of	  the	  changing	  nature	  of	  advanced	  capitalist	  economies.	   	  Health	  and	  social	  services	  
are	   thus	   conceptualized,	   like	   automobiles	   and	   soft-­‐wood	   lumber,	   as	   commodities	   that	   can	  
subjected	  to	  the	  same	  desire	  to	  decrease	  legal	  and	  regulatory	  barriers	  to	  their	  free	  flow	  across	  
national	  boundaries	  (Sanger	  and	  Sinclair,	  2004;	  Johnson,	  2004).	  
Put	  simply,	  the	  concern	  expressed	  by	  many	  defenders	  of	  the	  Canadian	  model	  of	  medicare	  was	  
that	   agreements	   like	   NAFTA	   would	   force	   provincial	   governments	   to	   open	   up	   their	   health	  
systems	   to	   privately	   operated	   facilities	   on	   the	   same	   terms	   that	   govern	   public	   facilities.	   	   The	  
spectre	  of	  private	  insurers	  and	  private	  hospital	  corporations	  from	  the	  United	  States	  flooding	  into	  
Canadian	   provinces	   eroding	   the	   public	   nature	   of	   health	   care	   in	   Canada	   and	   challenging	   the	  
notion	   that	   ‘need’	   supersede	   ‘ability	   to	  pay’	  drove	  critics	  of	   the	   trade	  agreements	   to	   insist	  on	  
protections	  for	  Canada’s	  model	  of	  health	  and	  social	  service	  delivery	  and	  financing.	  	  And,	  within	  
limits,	  the	  defenders	  of	  Canada’s	  medicare	  model	  won	  the	  day.	  
According	   to	   both	   trade	   lawyer	   Jon	   Johnson	   (2004)	   and	   the	   Canadian	   Centre	   for	   Policy	  
Alternatives	   (CCPA)	   (Sanger	   and	   Sinclair,	   2004),	   the	   terms	   of	   NAFTA	   Chapter	   11	   provides	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relatively	   strong	   protection	   for	   the	   existing	   social	   and	   health	   service	   delivery	   and	   financing	  
regimes	   in	   Canada.	   	   The	   challenge,	   though,	   is	   what	   could	   happen	   should	   the	   government	  
attempt	  to	  significantly	  change	  or	  expand	  the	  existing	  public	  system.	   	  For	  example,	  home	  care	  
services	  in	  Canada	  were	  at	  this	  time	  primarily	  delivered	  by	  private-­‐not-­‐for-­‐profit	  entities	  (such	  as	  
the	   Victorian	   Order	   of	   Nurses)	   often	   under	   contract	   to	   provincial	   governments	   and	   requiring	  
some	  co-­‐payment	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  service	  recipient.	   	  These	  services	  are	  not	  part	  of	  the	  core	  
medicare	  bargain	  that	  fully	  insures	  doctor	  and	  hospital	  services	  but	  are	  part	  of	  a	  second	  tier	  of	  
services	   that	   mix	   public	   subsidy	   with	   private	   insurance	   and	   out-­‐of-­‐pocket	   payments	  
(Marchildon,	   2006).	   	   The	  movement	   of	   large	   for-­‐profit	   enterprises	   into	   this	  market	  would	   be	  
allowable	  under	  the	  terms	  of	  NAFTA	  and	  any	  attempt	  by	  a	  government	  to	  forestall	  such	  a	  move	  
(or	   to	  bring	  home	  care	   into	   the	  core	  of	   fully	   insured	   services)	  would	   require	   compensation	   to	  
those	  private	  entities	  that	  would	  be	  pushed	  out	  of	  the	  marketplace.	  	  	  
Thus,	  in	  light	  of	  these	  international	  and	  national	  developments	  in	  the	  area	  of	  trade	  in	  services	  it	  
became	  important	  for	  provincial	  governments	  to	  establish	  a	  clear	  regulatory	  framework	  for	  the	  
operation	  of	   private	   facilities.	   	  As	  was	  noted	  earlier,	   Saskatchewan	  had	  no	   legal	   or	   regulatory	  
limitation	   on	   the	   offering	   of	   private	   insurance	   for	   publicly	   insured	   services	   and	   no	   legal	  
framework	  for	  the	  operation	  of	  private	  for-­‐profit	  health	  facilities.	  	  The	  relatively	  small	  size	  of	  the	  
Saskatchewan	  market	  (less	  than	  1	  million	  people	  dispersed	  in	  relatively	  small	  cities,	  towns	  and	  
rural	   municipalities	   in	   an	   area	   the	   size	   of	   France)	   and	   its	   lack	   of	   a	   significant	   private	   sector	  
entrepreneurial	   elite	   likely	  made	   the	   province	   an	   unappealing	   place	   for	   large	   scale	   corporate	  
health	   care	   investment.	   The	   only	   legal	   limitation	   it	   had	   on	   the	   development	   of	   a	   parallel	   for-­‐
profit	  delivery	  and	  financing	  health	  system	  was	  its	  prohibition	  on	  physicians’	  ability	  to	  practice	  in	  
both	  the	  public	  financed	  system	  and	  a	  private	  system	  simultaneously	  (McIntosh,	  2006).	  	  The	  ban	  
on	  so-­‐called	  ‘dual	  practice’	  physicians	  meant	  that	  it	  would	  be	  impossible	  for	  more	  than	  a	  hand	  
full	  of	  physicians	  to	  opt-­‐out	  of	  the	  public	  financing	  of	  their	  services	  and	  still	  generate	  sufficient	  
income	  to	  remain	  in	  practice.	  	  The	  government’s	  response	  to	  this	  legal	  and	  regulatory	  void	  was	  
the	  Health	  Facilities	  Licensing	  Act.	  
In	   the	  same	  way	  that	  Saskatchewan	  does	  not	  ban	  physicians	   from	  opting	  out	  of	   the	  provincial	  
health	   insurance	   system,	   the	  HFLA	   does	   not	   prohibit	   privately	   operated	   health	   facilities.	   	   The	  
legislation	  allows	  clinics	  to	  be	  operated	  insofar	  as	  they	  meet	  the	  regulatory	  standards	  set	  by	  the	  
Saskatchewan	  College	  of	  Physicians	  and	  Surgeons	  and	  on	  the	  condition	  that	  they	  rely	  entirely	  on	  
private	  payment	  for	  the	  services	  they	  provide.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  any	  clinic	  set	  up	  in	  the	  province	  
can	  not	  have	  a	  dual	  revenue	  stream	  from	  both	  public	  and	  private	  sources.	  	  As	  with	  physicians,	  a	  
facility	  must	  choose	  either	  public	  or	  private	  payment	  as	  its	  sole	  source	  of	  revenue.	  	  The	  upshot	  
of	  this	   legislation	  is	  that	  private	  for-­‐profit	  facilities	  are	  perfectly	   legal	   in	  Saskatchewan,	  but	  the	  
stipulation	   of	   a	   complete	   reliance	   on	   private	   revenue	   renders	   it	   highly	   unlikely	   that	   any	   such	  
clinic	  would	  be	  able	  to	  make	  a	  profit.	  	  	  
The	  HFLA	  lays	  out	  what	  appears,	  on	  the	  face	  of	  it,	  a	  relatively	  straightforward	  process	  whereby	  a	  
person	  (or	  corporation)	  looking	  to	  set	  up	  a	  private	  facility	  can	  obtain	  a	  license	  for	  the	  proposed	  
facility.	   	  However,	  to	  prevent	  the	  proliferation	  of	  private	  facilities,	  the	  application	  for	   licensure	  
must	   go	   through	   the	   Health	   Minister,	   who	   forwards	   the	   application	   to	   the	   accreditation	  
program	   operator	   (the	   CPSS)	   who	   reports	   to	   the	   Minister	   whether	   the	   facility	   conforms	   to	  
provincial	  health	  facility	  standards.	   	  The	  Regional	  Health	  Authority	  (RHA)iv	  where	  the	  proposed	  
facility	  is	  to	  be	  located	  is	  responsible	  for	  the	  determination	  of	  need	  for	  the	  facility	  in	  the	  region,	  
based	   on	   the	   subjective	   determination	   of	   the	   RHA	   and	   the	   Health	  Minister.	   	   If	   the	   proposed	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facility	  meets	  provincial	  standards	  and	  sufficient	  need	  is	  assessed	  for	  such	  a	  facility,	  the	  license	  
is	  granted.	  
Some	  of	  the	  physicians	  interviewed	  for	  this	  study	  noted	  that	  the	  power	  given	  to	  the	  Minister	  of	  
Health	   with	   respect	   to	   the	   licensing	   of	   such	   facilities	   was,	   in	   their	   view,	   excessive.	   	   As	   one	  
commented,	  “[I]t	  was	  absolute	  power…it	  basically	  allowed	  the	  Minister	  to	  determine,	  based	  on	  
a	  very	  broad	  set	  of	  criteria,	  whether	  or	  not	  there	  would	  be	  [a	  private	  facility]	  and	  some	  of	  it	  was	  
smudgy	   enough	   like	   need,	   that	   it	   allowed	   the	   Minister	   to	   essentially	   say	   no	   to	   any	   and	   all	  
requests	   for	   private	   clinics”.	   	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   this	   authority	   vis	   a	   vis	   private	   facilities	   is	   no	  
different	  in	  form	  or	  substance	  than	  that	  given	  to	  the	  Minister	  and	  the	  government	  vis	  a	  vis	  the	  
establishment	  of	  publicly	  financed	  hospitals	  hospitals.	  	  	  
Furthermore,	   once	   a	   license	   is	   granted	   for	   a	   private	   facility,	   it	  must	   be	   renewed	  nine	  months	  
prior	   to	   its	   expiry	   date;	   which	   again,	   is	   an	   action	   carried	   out	   by	   the	   Minister.	   	   To	   receive	   a	  
renewed	   license,	   the	   applicant	   must	   comply	   with	   the	   regulations	   of	   the	   Health	   Facilities	  
Licensing	  Act	  and	  any	  other	   legislation	   that	   is	  appropriate	  concerning	   the	  creation	  of	  any	  new	  
business.	  	  At	  the	  renewal	  point,	  there	  must	  also	  be	  a	  continued	  need	  for	  the	  facility,	  the	  facility	  
must	  be	  an	  “effective	  and	  efficient	  use	  of	  public	  resources”	  (HFLA,	  Section	  7(2))	  and	  the	  Minister	  
may	   refuse	  a	   license	   renewal	   if	   the	   criteria	   are	  not	  deemed	   to	  be	   satisfied.	   	   These	   conditions	  
appear	  to	  provide	  a	  broad	  interpretive	  scope	  for	  the	  Minister	  which	  could	  be	  used	  to	  shut	  down	  
any	  private	  clinic	  in	  the	  province.	  	  
The	  Health	  Facilities	  Licensing	  Act	  also	  prevents	  facilities	  from	  charging	  extra	  fees	  for	  so-­‐called	  
“Cadillac	  services”	  which	  are	  deemed	  to	  be	  superior	  to	  those	  offered	  by	  the	  public	  plan:	  	  
Any	   amount	   paid	   by	   or	   on	   behalf	   of	   a	   [patient],	   whether	   paid	   to	   the	   person	  
providing	  the	  diagnostic	  or	  therapeutic	  medical	  procedure	  or	  another	  person,	  is	  
deemed	  to	  be	  a	  fee	  if	  the	  licensee	  or	  the	  person	  who	  provides	  the	  procedure	  at	  
a	   health	   facility	   required	   the	   payment	   as	   a	   condition	   of	   providing	   those	  
procedures."	  (HFLA,	  Section	  12(4)a)	  	  
To	  make	  certain	  that	  extra	  fees	  are	  not	  being	  collected,	  the	  licensee	  must	  provide	  the	  Minister	  
with	  an	  annual	  financial	  statement	  to	  prove	  compliance	  with	  the	  legislation.	  	  The	  key	  informant	  
interviews	   indicated	   that	  most	   interests	   understood	   the	   need	   for	   this	   type	   of	   provision	   to	   be	  
placed	  within	  the	  act.	  	  	  
Saskatchewan's	  Medical	   Care	   Insurance	   Act	   and	   the	   Health	   Facilities	   Licensing	   Act,	   working	  
together,	  make	  it	  virtually	  impossible	  for	  physicians	  to	  obtain	  substantial	  benefit	  from	  practicing	  
outside	  the	  public	  system.	  	  While	  the	  Medical	  Care	  Insurance	  Act	  states	  that	  a	  physician	  can	  act	  
outside	   the	   public	   system	   and	   that	   patients	   are	   obliged	   to	   pay	   for	   their	   services,	   the	  Health	  
Facilities	   Licensing	  Act	   prohibits	   any	  payment	   greater	   than	  what	   the	  public	   system	  would	  pay	  
(this	  prohibits	  extra-­‐billing).	   	  This	  produces	  a	  non-­‐inviting	  climate	  for	  private	  health	  care	  clinics	  
in	  the	  province	  as	  such	  provisions	  make	  it	  extremely	  difficult	  to	  turn	  a	  profit.	   	  
The	  Development	  and	  Passage	  of	  the	  HFLA	  	  
Despite	   the	   limitations	   that	   the	   Act	   puts	   on	   physicians,	   it	   was	   accepted	   and	   applauded	   by	  
government	  and	  union	  actors.	  	  One	  elected	  official	  described	  it	  as	  “a	  broad	  consensus”	  amongst	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political	  actors,	  the	  civil	  service,	  trade	  unions	  and	  even	  some	  of	  the	  professional	  organizations.	  	  
For	  the	  unions	  the	  possibility	  of	  private	  healthcare	  facilities	  meant	  an	  increase	  in	  non-­‐unionized	  
healthcare	   positions	   which	   in	   turn	   would	   lead	   to	   a	   decrease	   in	   the	   overall	   percentage	   of	  
healthcare	  workers	  who	  are	  unionized.	  	  	  
While	  all	  interests	  on	  the	  government	  side	  of	  things,	  including	  elected	  officials	  and	  civil	  servants,	  
were	  content	  with	  the	  Act,	  interests	  from	  the	  Radiology	  Associates	  and	  from	  the	  Saskatchewan	  
Medical	  Association	  (SMA)	  were	  less	  enthusiastic.	  	  One	  such	  person	  interviewed	  used	  the	  word	  
“contempt”	  when	  describing	  the	  feelings	  of	  some	  professional	  associations	  about	  the	  Act:	  
we	  have	  standards	  that	  we	  have	  to	  live	  up	  to	  with	  the	  College	  of	  Physicians	  and	  
Surgeons…We	  can't	  practice	  substandard	  medicine…It's	  the	  practice	  of	  medicine	  
basically	  and	  to	  have	  the	  government	  have	  a	  whole	  other	  set	  of	  regulations	  on	  
top	  of	   that	   it's	   kind	  of…when	   is	   enough,	  enough?…Now	  we're	   regulated	  by	  or	  
we	  would	  be	   regulated	  by	   the	  Health	   Facilities	  Act,	   there's	   the	  College	   review	  
process	   that	   has	   to	   do	  with	   our	   licensure…How	  many	   of	   these	   hoops	   do	   you	  
have	  to	  jump	  through?	  	  
The	  Saskatchewan	  Medical	  Association,	  while	  privately	  unhappy	  with	  the	  legislation,	  chose	  not	  
to	  make	   its	   displeasure	   public	   (perhaps	   in	   part	   because	   the	   legislation	  was	   presented	   by	   the	  
government	  as	  protecting	  medicare	  and	  shoring	  up	  the	  other	  reforms	  being	  undertaken	  within	  
the	  provinces).	   	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  knowing	  that	  at	  least	  some	  elements	  within	  the	  SMA	  would	  
be	  opposed	  to	   the	   legislation	  the	  government	  “did	  advise	   [the	  SMA	  about	   the	   legislation]	  and	  
we	  met	  and	  we…had	  several	  meetings	  and	  discussions	  and	  in	  the	  end,	  they	  made	  it	  clear	  they	  
[Government]	  were	  going	  to	  introduce	  the	  legislation,	  but	  we	  did	  get	  some	  changes	  to	  it	  that	  we	  
could	  live	  with.”	  	  	  
The	  Health	  Facilities	  Licensing	  Act	   is	  the	  product	  of	  a	  relatively	  short	  policy	  process.	  	  According	  
to	   one	   informant,	   “compared	   to	   many	   legislative	   agendas,	   this	   moved	   forward	   relatively	  
quickly.”	   	   However,	   while	   the	   actual	   policy	   did	   not	   undergo	   a	   lengthy	   policy-­‐making	   process,	  
“the	  government	  had	  a	  sense	  that	  this	  was	  the	  road	  they	  would	  like	  to	  go	  down…much	  before	  
the	  actual	  tabling	  of	  the	  Act…at	  least	  for	  a	  year	  or	  more	  we	  [the	  SMA	  and	  Government]	  were	  in	  
discussions.	   	   There	  was	   some	   length	  of	   time	  during	  which	   the	   government	   contemplated	   this	  
before	  they	  moved	  forward.”	  	  
However,	  the	  time	  between	  the	  decision	  made	  and	  the	  actual	  tabling	  of	  the	  Act	  was	  relatively	  
short,	  according	  to	  most	  of	  our	  participants:	  “the	  actual	  decision	  to	  proceed	  with	  this	  particular	  
piece	  of	  legislation	  …moved	  quickly	  when	  I	  think	  the	  government	  got	  a	  sense	  that	  there	  was	  an	  
impending	  plan	  by	  private	  investors	  to	  develop	  a	  private	  MRI	  unit.”	  	  Another	  possibility	  that	  was	  
discussed	  was	  the	  creation	  of	  an	  MRI	  facility	  by	  a	  First	  Nations	  community	  which	  might	  have	  put	  
a	  reserve-­‐based	  private	  facility	  out	  of	  the	  reach	  of	  provincial	  regulatory	  control.	  	  	  	  
Furthermore,	  once	  the	  Act	  made	  it	  to	  the	  floor	  of	  the	  legislature,	  debate	  was	  short	  and	  simple	  
and	   the	  Act	  was	  passed	  without	  much	  determined	  opposition.	   	  At	   this	  point	   in	   time,	   the	  NDP	  
held	   42	   out	   of	   the	   legislature’s	   58	   seats	   and	   the	   two	   opposition	   parties	   (the	   Liberals	  with	   11	  
seats	  and	  the	  Conservatives	  with	  5	  seats)v	  were,	  in	  the	  view	  of	  one	  key	  informant,	  as	  concerned	  
about	  positioning	  themselves	  relative	   to	  each	  other	  as	   they	  were	  about	  opposing	  government	  
policy.	  	  And	  health	  policy	  is	  particularly	  problematic	  insofar	  as	  centrist	  and	  even	  right-­‐of-­‐centre	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voters	   have	   traditionally	   tended	   to	   favour	   public	   oversight	   and	   administration	   of	   health	   care	  
delivery,	   thus	  making	   both	   opposition	   parties	   “very	   cautious	   about	   the	   [possibility]	   that	   they	  
may	  get	  trapped	  on	  the	  wrong	  side	  of	  the	  health	  debate”.	  
One	  thing	  that	  was	  not	  entirely	  clear	  to	  many	  of	  the	  key	   informants	  was	  where	  the	   legislation	  
originated	  inside	  the	  government.	  	  To	  the	  extent	  that	  the	  legislation	  seems	  to	  have	  been	  driven	  
by	  a	  philosophical	  belief	   in	   the	  preservation	  of	  publicly	  administered	  health	  care	  as	  well	  as	  by	  
the	  need	  for	  a	  NDP	  government	  to	  restore	  some	  of	  its	  political	  bone	  fides	  after	  being	  forced	  to	  
make	   significant	   cuts	   in	   public	   expenditures,	   some	   of	   the	   key	   informants	   clearly	   saw	   the	  
Premier’s	   fingerprints	   on	   the	   HFLA.	   	   Others,	   though,	   tended	   to	   see	   the	   HFLA	   as	   an	   initiative	  
driven	  by	  then	  Minister	  of	  Health	  Eric	  Cline	  and	  given	  shape	  and	  substance	  by	  long-­‐time	  deputy-­‐
minister	  of	  health	  Duane	  Adams.	  	  Key	  informants	  from	  inside	  the	  government	  agreed,	  though	  it	  
certainly	  had	  strong	  support	  from	  the	  Premier	  and	  the	  Minister’s	  cabinet	  colleagues.	  
On	  one	  level,	  whether	  the	  HFLA	  was	  the	  brain-­‐child	  of	  the	  premier	  or	  his	  minister	  is	  irrelevant.	  
As	  one	  key	   informant	  noted,	  Premiers’	  can	  set	  a	  tone	  for	  their	  government	   in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  
ministers	  and	  senior	  civil	  servants	  know	  what	   is	  expected	  of	  them	  and	  know	  the	  overall	  policy	  
direction	   the	   premier	   wants	   to	   pursue.	   	   And	   good	   ministers	   and	   deputy-­‐ministers	   will	  
proactively	   pursue	   policy	   innovations	   that	   move	   in	   that	   direction.	   	   And	   it	   is	   clear	   is	   that,	  
according	  to	  the	  key	  informants	  interviewed,	  this	  was	  legislation	  that	  was	  conceived	  and	  pushed	  
forward	   to	  not	   just	   fill	   a	   regulatory	   gap	  but	   to	   fill	   that	   gap	   in	   a	  manner	   that	  met	   the	  political	  
objectives	  of	  the	  government.	  	  	  	  	  	  
This	  view	  is	  further	  substantiated	  by	  activities	  on	  the	   intergovernmental	  front	  that	  occurred	  in	  
the	   eighteen	   months	   preceding	   the	   passage	   of	   the	   HFLA.	   	   A	   1994	   meeting	   of	   the	   federal-­‐
provincial-­‐territorial	   Ministers	   of	   Health	   resulted	   in	   a	   statement	   committing	   the	  Ministers	   to	  
maintaining	   a	   health	   system	   consistent	   with	   the	   five	   principles	   of	   the	   Canada	   Health	   Act:	  	  
comprehensiveness,	   universality,	   accessibility,	   affordability,	   and	   public	   administration.	   	   This	  
statement,	   according	   to	   one	   key	   informant,	   was	   necessitated	   by	   the	   federal	   government’s	  
concern	  over	  the	  growing	  number	  of	  private	  for-­‐profit	  facilities	  opening	  across	  the	  country	  and	  
their	   potential	   to	   erode	   the	   principle	   of	   access	   based	   on	   need	   rather	   than	   ability	   to	   pay	   and	  
committed	   the	  Ministers	   to	   take	   the	   steps	   needed	   to	   regulate	   the	   evolution	  of	   private	   clinics	  
and	  maintain	  the	  publicly	  funded	  system.	  
Thus,	  for	  those	  participants	  outside	  of	  the	  government,	  the	  legislation	  was	  often	  seen	  as	  being,	  
for	   those	   critical	   of	   the	   government,	   ideologically	   driven	   and,	   for	   those	   supportive	   of	   the	  
government,	   reflective	   of	   the	   government’s	   social	   democratic	   tendencies.	   	   As	   one	   physician	  
remarked,	  “our	  perception	  at	  the	  time	  was	  that	  it	  was	  driven	  ideologically.	  	  But	  I	  was	  always	  not	  
entirely	  sure	  that	  it	  wasn't	  driven	  partly	  with	  the	  knowledge	  that	  at	  some	  point	  they	  might	  have	  
to	   go	   this	   route	   in	   certain	   areas”.	   	   An	   SMA	   staffer	   also	   agreed	   that	   this	   decision	   was	   based	  
largely	  on	  political	  philosophy:	  
Why	   I	   say	   that	   is	   the	   quality	   part	   of	   it	  would	   easily	   be	   covered	   and	   has	   been	  
subsequently	  in	  other	  ways.	  	  So	  although	  they	  would	  argue	  that	  it	  was	  to	  assure	  
good	  quality…[and	   the]	   need	   for	   some	  Act	   that	  might	   govern	   private	   facilities	  
one	   can	   argue	   wasn't	   just	   ideological	   in	   the	   context	   of	   [the]	   private/public	  
[debate].	  	  But	  I	  think	  the	  motivation	  for	  this	  Act	  was	  almost	  entirely	  ideological.	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A	  member	  of	   the	  College	  of	  Physicians	  and	  Surgeons	  agreed:	  “it	  was	  an	  agenda	  driven	  by	   the	  
fact	   that	   the	   government	   of	   the	   province	   and	   the	  day	   felt	   strongly	   that	   the	   preferred	  way	   to	  
deliver	  services	  is	  through	  publicly	  owned,	  publicly	  governed	  facilities	  but	  that	  if	  there	  are	  going	  
to	  be	  other	  facilities,	  they	  ought	  to	  be	  subject	  to	  fairly	  rigorous	  government	  regulation”.	  
A	  similar	  view	  came	  from	  one	  elected	  official,	  though	  with	  a	  more	  positive	  interpretation	  of	  the	  
legislation:	  	  
[C]ertainly	   there	   was	   some	   discussion	   about	   the	   details	   and	   how	   you	   would	  
define	  what	  was	   covered	   by	   the	  Act	   and…what	  wasn't	   covered	   but	  we	   had	   a	  
pretty	  clear	   idea	  because	  to	  us,	  certainly	   in	  the	  New	  Democratic	  Party	  and	  the	  
Department	  of	  Health	   in	  Saskatchewan,	   the	  principle	  of	  a	   single-­‐tiered	   system	  
and	   a	   single-­‐payer	   system	  and	   the	   avoidance	  of	   a	   two-­‐tiered	   system	   is	   a	   very	  
fundamental	   principle.	   	   And	   so	   from	   that	   principle	   the	   structure	   of	   the	   Act	  
followed…quite	  logically.	  
Perhaps	  to	  counter	  the	  charge	  that	  the	   legislation	  was	   ‘ideologically	  driven’	  and	  the	  argument	  
that	   the	   goals	   of	   the	   legislation	   could	   be	   achieved	   through	   existing	   regulatory	   means,	   the	  
government	   emphasized	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   legislation	   was	   designed	   to	   insure	   the	   quality	   of	  
services	   provided	   regardless	   of	   whether	   they	   were	   paid	   for	   publicly	   or	   privately.	   	   There	   is	  
evidence	   that	   not-­‐for-­‐profit	   and	   	   publicly	   funded	   health	   services	   tend	   to	   be	   of	   higher	   quality	  
than	   those	   funded	  privately	   (Devereaux	  et	  al.,	  2002:	  1399-­‐1406)	  and,	   in	   the	  words	  of	  one	  key	  
informant,	  “the	  government	  wanted	  to	  be	   in	  a	  position	  to	  control	   those	   facilities	   in	   the	  public	  
interest”	  and	  to	  insure	  the	  quality	  that	  generally	  accompanies	  a	  public	  system.	  	  But	  opponents	  
to	   the	   legislation	   argued	   that	   it	  was	   less	   about	   control	   over	   quality	   than	   it	  was	   about	   control	  
more	   generally	   –	   a	   desire	   to	   limit	   the	   growth	   of	   private	   facilities	   and	   to	   control	   costs	   by	  
controlling	  access	  to	  services.	  
According	  to	  a	  government	  official,	  the	  government's	  ultimate	  goal	  in	  implementing	  the	  Health	  
Facilities	  Licensing	  Act	  was:	  
to	   prevent	   the	   erosion	   of	   the	   public	   system	   by	   shutting	   the	   door	   to…private	  
facilities	  that	  might	  engage	   in	  cream	  skimming	  and	  professional	   luring	  away	  at	  
the	  expense	  of	   the	  general	  public	  who	  might	  not	  be	  able	   to	  afford	   to	  get	   into	  
the	   bidding	  war	  with	   everybody	   else	   to	   see	  who	  was	   going	   to	   get	   the	   fastest	  
cataract	  removal	  or	  hip	  replacement.	  
A	  number	  of	  factors	  were	  in	  play	  at	  the	  time	  to	  give	  government	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	   it	  was	  
only	   a	   matter	   of	   time	   before	   private	   facilities	   were	   to	   trickle	   into	   Saskatchewan.	   	   Some	  
originated	  within	  the	  province,	  such	  as	  government's	  past	  experience	  with	  medical	  laboratories,	  
the	  possibility	  that	  a	  free-­‐standing	  abortion	  clinic	  (possibly	  operated	  by	  Dr.	  Henry	  Morgenthaler)	  
might	  be	  in	  the	  offing,	  and	  the	  threat	  of	  a	  private	  cataract	  clinic	  operated	  by	  an	  Alberta-­‐based	  
physician.	   	   Other	   factors,	   however,	   reached	   beyond	   the	   borders	   of	   the	   province	   as	  
Saskatchewan	  was	   looking	   at	  what	  was	   happening	   in	  Alberta	  with	   respect	   to	   private	   facilities	  
(Church	  and	  Smith,	  2006).	  	  Furthermore,	  there	  was	  a	  concern	  that	  the	  opening	  of	  a	  few	  private	  
clinics	  would	  lead	  to	  a	  massive	  influx	  of	  American	  clinics	  due	  to	  provisions	  in	  the	  North	  American	  
Free	  Trade	  Agreement	  (NAFTA).	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A	   few	   years	   prior,	   in	   the	   early	   1990s,	   private	   medical	   laboratories	   were	   permitted	   in	   the	  
province.	  	  This	  proved	  to	  be	  problematic	  as	  the	  number	  of	  laboratories	  swelled	  to	  a	  point	  where	  
the	  province	  could	  not	  support	  such	  a	  large	  number	  and	  thus	  needed	  controls	  on	  the	  number	  of	  
labs.	  	  Government	  implemented	  the	  Medical	  Laboratory	  Licensing	  Act	  in	  1994	  to	  counteract	  the	  
swelling	  number	  of	  labs.	  	  In	  the	  words	  of	  one	  key	  informant:	  
With	  the	  Medical	  Laboratory	  Licensing	  Act	  there	  was	  …the	  rationalization	  of	  the	  
laboratory	   system	   that	   the	   government	   would	   only	   license	   those	   outlets	   that	  
were	  necessary	  to	  provide	  the	  service	  to	  the	  public,	  so	  they	  didn’t'	  want	  to	  fund	  
a	   lot	   of	   redundancy…And	   so	   carrying	   those	   principles	   over	   to	   the	   [Health	  
Facilities	   Licensing	   Act]	   I	   think	   there	   was	   some	   concern…if	   you	   didn't	   have	   a	  
vehicle	  for	  controlling	  how	  many	  of	  these	  outlets	  that	  you	  had,	  you	  would	  run	  
the	   risk	  of	  excess	   capacity	  and	   then	  you'd	  have	   the	  cost	   somehow,	  you	  know,	  
transferred	  over	  to	  the	  public	  system	  one	  way	  or	  another	  through	  negotiations	  
or	   other	   vehicles.	   	   So	   I	   think	   it	   was…an	   issue	   of	   concern,	   not	   just	   that	   there	  
would	  be	  one	  such	  a	  facility	  come	  in,	  but	  if	  they	  began	  to	  proliferate	  you	  would	  
have	  no	  mechanism	  for	  controlling	  it	  if	  you	  didn’t	  do	  legislation	  like	  this.	  	  
Many	  participants	  cited	  medical	  laboratories	  as	  a	  starting	  point	  for	  the	  Health	  Facilities	  Licensing	  
Act	  because	  of	  the	  similarities	  in	  the	  cases	  –	  the	  question	  of	  private	  ownership	  of	  facilities,	  the	  
need	  to	  regulate	  quality	  of	  care	  and	  the	  conditions	  of	  operation.	  	  These	  would	  all	  be	  part	  of	  the	  
licensing	  and	  re-­‐licensing	  procedure	  to	  insure	  provincial	  standards	  are	  met.	  	  	  
While	   the	   government	   was	   drawing	   on	   past	   experiences,	   it	   was	   also	   drawing	   on	   what	   it	  
perceived	  as	   threats	   to	   the	  public	   system.	   	  Some	  participants	  mentioned	   that	   there	  may	  have	  
been	   the	   possibility	   of	   a	   Morgentaler-­‐style	   abortion	   clinic	   opening	   in	   the	   province.	   	   Elected	  
officials,	   however,	   denied	   such	   a	   claim	   and	   asserted	   that	   this	   was	   not	   part	   of	   the	   Cabinet’s	  
deliberations	   on	   the	  HFLA.	   	   One	   participant	   from	  outside	   the	   government	   also	   dismissed	   this	  
possibility	   because	   “there	   is	   a	   bylaw,	   under	   the	  Medical	   Practice	   Act	   which	   is	   the	   Act	   that	  
governs	  the	  College	  of	  Physicians	  and	  Surgeons,	  that	  says	  that	  abortions	  in	  this	  province	  can	  be	  
conducted	  only	  in	  accredited	  hospitals…And	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  bylaw,	  in	  essence,	  is	  to	  prevent	  
free	   standing	   abortion	   clinics	   like	  Morgentaler's	   from	   being	   established	   in	   Saskatchewan.”	   So	  
given	   that	   there	   is	   already	   legislation	   restricting	   such	   a	   facility	   from	   being	   opened	   in	   the	  
province	  of	  Saskatchewan,	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  make	  the	  point	  that	  the	  Health	  Facilities	  Licensing	  Act	  
had	  the	  purpose	  of	  restricting	  this	  type	  of	  facility.	  	  	  
But	   there	   were	   concerns	   about	   other	   private	   facilities	   that	   may	   have	   been	   in	   the	   planning	  
stages,	  in	  particular	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  private	  ophthalmology	  clinic	  opening	  up	  in	  the	  province.	  	  
In	  the	  words	  of	  one	  participant:	  
[T]here	   is	   an	   ophthalmologist	   who	   does	   cataract	   surgeries	   in	   Saskatoon…And	  
like	   most	   surgeons	   he	   was	   concerned…about	   getting	   enough	   operating	   time,	  
operating	  room	  time.	  And	  he	  had	  a	  plan	  [in	  the	  early	  1990s]	  to	  open	  up	  a	  free-­‐
standing	  clinic	   to	  provide	  cataract	   surgeries.	   	  This	  physicians	  …	  saw	  a	  business	  
opportunity	  here	  where	  he	  could	  really	  control	  OR	  time	  because	  he	  would	  own	  
it,	   would	   be	   able	   to	   put	   through	   a	   lot	   of	   cataracts	   this	   way,	   and	   the	   initial	  
business	   plan	  was	   that	   he	  would	   do	   the	  public	   cases	   in	   the	  hospital	   and	   then	  
he'd	   have	   a	   private	   clinic	   and	   put	   some	  private	   cases	   in	   his	   clinic…And	   at	   the	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time	  it	  was	  unclear	  as	  to	  whether	  such	  an	  activity	  would	  be	  legal	  or	  illegal	  in	  the	  
province.	  
There	   were	   also	   developments	   in	   Alberta	   that	   were	   of	   some	   concern	   to	   the	   government	   of	  
Saskatchewan.	   	  While	  private	   clinics	  had	  existed	   in	  Alberta	   for	   some	   time	   (Nameth,	  1994:	  14-­‐
15),	   the	  most	  well	   known	  being	   the	  Gimbel	  eye	   clinics	   that	  offered	  private	   cataract	   surgeries,	  
there	  was	  some	  concern	  that	  Alberta	  might	  go	  further	  in	  allowing	  the	  construction	  of	  privately	  
financed	  and	  operated	  hospitals	  to	  be	  built	  in	  the	  province.	  	  As	  one	  elected	  official	  explained:	  	  
[P]eople	  started	  going	  to	  the	  Gimble	  clinics	  in	  Calgary	  to	  get	  their	  eyes	  done	  –	  to	  
get	   their	   cataracts	   removed	   and	   so	   that	   became	  an	   issue	  because	  Alberta,	   up	  
until	   sometime	   in	   1996,	   allowed	   their	   facilities	   to	   extra	   bill.	   	   And	   we	   were	  
grappling	  with	   a	   long	  and	  difficult	  waiting	   list	   for	   cataract	   removal,	   a	  problem	  
that	  ironically	  has	  gone	  away	  using	  the	  public	  system…So	  we	  thought	  that	  since	  
there	   was	   a	   national	   debate	   between	   the	   federal	   government	   and	   the	  
government	  of	  Alberta	   as	   to	  whether	  private	   facilities	   should	  be	   able	   to	   extra	  
bill…we	  	  would	  be	  proactive	  and	  say	  that	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  both	  principle	  and	  in	  our	  
view	   the	   efficacy	   of	   the	   health	   care	   system	   that	   we	   would	   have	   a	   regime	  
whereby	  private	  facilities	  operating	  outside	  the	  public	  system	  would	  be	  licensed	  
by	  the	  public	  system	  and	  would	  work	  in	  accordance	  with	  certain	  rules	  that	  the	  
public	  system	  operated,	  including	  no	  extra	  billing.	  
And	   the	   	   concern	   of	   facilities	  moving	   in	   from	   other	   provinces	   (or	   developed	   by	   physicians	   in	  
Saskatchewan	  wanting	   to	   replicate	   an	  Alberta	  model)	  were	   compounded	  by	   the	   concern	   that	  
such	  facilities	  would	  be	  difficult	  to	  forestall	  once	  they	  were	  established	  because	  of	  the	  terms	  of	  
the	  	  North	  American	  Free	  Trade	  Agreement	  (NAFTA).	  	  In	  the	  words	  of	  one	  of	  the	  representatives	  
of	  a	  major	  stakeholder	  organization:	  	  
[W]hen	   you	   look	   at	   the	   environment	   that	   was	   occurring	   at	   the	   time	   and	   the	  
rationale	   for	   introducing	   the	  private	   facilities	   legislation,	  NAFTA	  had	   just	  come	  
in,	  there	  was	  some	  significant	  concern	  that	  any	  sort	  of	   liberalization	  outside	  of	  
the	  Canada	   Health	   Act	   would	   result	   in	   the	   loss	   in	   perpetuity	   of	   the	   ability	   to	  
manage	   that	   part	   of	   the	   public	   sector	   and	   would	   open	   up	   the,	   basically	   the	  
market	  place	  to	  untold	  numbers	  of	  private	  facilities	  dispensing	  a	  lot	  of	  medical	  
care	   that	   would	   previously	   have	   been	   hospital-­‐based…So	   the	   NAFTA	  
environment	  was	  something	  we	  heard	  a	  lot	  from	  stakeholdersvi.	  
While	  recognizing	  that	  NAFTA	  may	  have	  been	  a	  concern,	  other	  key	  informants	  discounted	  it	  as	  a	  
key	   factor	   in	   the	  passage	  of	   the	   legislation.	   	   At	   best	   they	   argued	   that	   the	   fear	   of	   an	   influx	   of	  
private	   capital	   operating	   outside	   of	   the	   publicly	   administered	   system	  was	   theoretical	   at	   best.	  	  
The	  small	  population	  of	   the	  province	  and	   the	   fact	   that	   it	   is	   relatively	  dispersed	   in	   small	  urban	  
and	   rural	   centres	  meant	   that	   there	  was	   unlikely	   to	   be	   a	   sufficiently	   large	   enough	  market	   for	  
privately	   purchased	   health	   services	   to	   justify	   the	   necessary	   investment.	   	   And	  multiple	   private	  
investors	   would	   have	   to	   bid	   up	   the	   cost	   of	   health	   human	   resources	   and	   lower	   the	   price	   of	  
services	  to	  the	  public	  in	  order	  to	  compete.	  	  	  So	  while	  the	  HFLA	  may	  have	  closed	  off	  a	  threat	  of	  
foreign	  private	  investment,	  it	  is	  not	  at	  all	  clear	  that	  this	  threat	  was	  at	  all	  immanent.	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But	  the	  mere	  possibility	  of	  such	  a	  development	  meant	  that	  the	  legislation	  appealed	  to	  some	  key	  
political	  constituencies	  that	  may	  well	  have	  been	  dismayed	  by	  some	  of	  the	  cost-­‐cutting	  measures	  
of	  the	  early	  Romanow	  years.	  	  Whatever	  the	  weight	  given	  to	  possible	  role	  of	  NAFTA	  as	  a	  spur	  to	  
the	   HFLA,	   it	   is	   certainly	   one	   of	   the	   incidental	   forces	   which	   intersected	   in	   the	   mid-­‐1990s	  
contributing	   to	   the	   need	   for	   government	   to	   address	   the	   issue	   of	   private	   for-­‐profit	   health	  
facilities.	  
Conclusions	  
Both	   the	   documentary	   and	   key	   informant	   evidence	   point	   to	   a	   multiplicity	   of	   factors	  
driving	   the	   development	   and	   passage	   of	   the	   Health	   Facilities	   Licensing	   Act	   in	   Saskatchewan.	  	  
Institutionally,	   there	  was	  a	  clear	   regulatory	  void	  when	   it	  came	  to	   the	  operation	  of	  health	  care	  
facilities	  outside	  of	  the	  public	  system.	  	  The	  province’s	  past	  experience	  with	  medical	  laboratories	  
gave	  some	   impetus	   to	   the	   idea	  that	  a	   framework	  was	  needed	  to	  regulate	   the	  number	  of	  such	  
facilities	  and	   to	   insure	   the	  quality	  of	   the	  services	   they	  were	   to	  provide	  and	  better	   that	   such	  a	  
framework	  be	  in	  place	  prior	  to	  these	  issues	  becoming	  a	  political	  headache	  for	  the	  government.	  	  
And	   regardless	   of	   how	   likely	   any	   one	   of	   the	   potential	   sources	   of	   private	   investment	   were,	  
whether	  it	  was	  a	  single	  physician	  in	  Saskatoon,	  the	  expansion	  of	  Alberta-­‐based	  cataract	  surgery	  
clinics	   or	   even	   foreign	   investors	   operating	   under	   the	   auspices	   of	   NAFTA,	   the	   combination	   of	  
those	  possibilities	  provided	  a	  clear	  rationale	  for	  the	  legislation	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  civil	  service	  and	  
the	  government.	  
While	   the	  opposition	   to	   the	   legislation	  was	  decidedly	  muted,	   it	  was	  not	  entirely	   silent.	   	   Inside	  
the	  legislature,	  the	  two	  opposition	  parties	  were	  too	  focused	  on	  their	  own	  survival	  to	  serve	  as	  a	  
coalescing	   point	   for	   any	   interests	   opposed	   to	   the	  HFLA.	   	   Ultimately,	  most	   Conservative	  MLAs	  
would	   join	   the	   new	   Saskatchewan	   Party	   and	   the	   Liberal	   party	   would	   be	   split	   apart	   by	   the	  
decision	  of	   some	   caucus	  members	   to	   join	   a	   coalition	   government	  with	   the	  NDP	   following	   the	  
1999	   election.	   	   Those	   stakeholder	   interests	   that	   questioned	   either	   the	   rationale	   for	   the	  
legislation	  or	  the	  specifics	  of	  the	  regulatory	  framework	   itself	  proved	  either	  unable	  or	  unwilling	  
to	  launch	  a	  public	  fight	  with	  the	  government.	  	  Indeed,	  this	  may	  well	  be	  because	  they	  themselves	  
were	   divided	   on	   the	   issue.	   	   Though	   some	   of	   the	   key	   informants	   interviewed	   expressed	   some	  
support	   for	   idea	   of	   a	   parallel	   private	   system	   as	   a	   legitimate	   ‘safety-­‐valve’	   in	   a	   predominantly	  
publicly	   financed	   system,	   none	   of	   the	   major	   stakeholders	   took	   public	   stands	   against	   the	  
legislation,	   preferring	   to	   air	   their	   concerns	   in	   private	  meetings	   with	   the	   government.	   	   In	   the	  
same	  way	  that	  one	  key	   informant	  noted	  the	  reluctance	  of	  the	  Opposition	  to	  come	  out	   ‘on	  the	  
wrong	  side	  of	  the	  health	  care	  debate’,	  stakeholder	  organizations	  within	  the	  health	  care	  system	  
rely	   on	   public	   support	   to	   legitimize	   their	   role	   in	   protecting	   their	   own	   interests	   within	   that	  
system.	   	  For	  the	  medical	  association	  or	  other	  professional	  organizations	  to	  come	  out	  against	  a	  
bill	  ostensibly	  designed	   to	  protect	   the	  public	  nature	  of	   the	   systems’	   financing	  could	  well	  have	  
undermined	  the	  public’s	  generally	  strong	  support	  of	  health	  professionals’	  role	  within	  health	  care	  
in	  the	  province.	  
Finally,	  there	  are	  the	  political	  considerations	  that	  clearly	  factored	  into	  the	  legislation’s	  adoption.	  	  
In	   the	   first	   instance,	   the	  approach	  to	  private	   facility	   regulation	  outlined	   in	   the	  HFLA	   is	  entirely	  
consistent	   with	   the	   ideological	   predispositions	   of	   a	   moderate	   centre-­‐left	   social	   democratic	  
political	  party	   like	   the	  Saskatchewan	  NDP.	   	  And	   it	   is	  entirely	  consistent	  with	   the	  government’s	  
desire	  to	  protect	  and	  extend	  the	  party’s	  and	  the	  province’s	  legacy	  as	  the	  so-­‐called	  ‘birthplace	  of	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medicare’.	  	  Indeed,	  in	  his	  role	  as	  head	  of	  the	  Commission	  on	  the	  Future	  of	  Health	  Care	  in	  Canada	  
in	  2002,	  Romanow	  would	  describe	  Saskatchewan’s	  development	  of	  medicare	  as	  “a	  courageous	  
initiative	  by	  visionary	  men	  and	  women	  that	  changed	  us	  as	  a	  nation…”	  (Canada,	  2002a:	  xxi).	  	  	  
And	  it	  is	  no	  less	  true	  that	  the	  government,	  having	  made	  difficult	  choices	  to	  cut	  health	  and	  social	  
spending	  early	  in	  its	  mandate	  to	  meet	  the	  increasing	  demands	  from	  both	  inside	  and	  outside	  the	  
province	  that	  it	  restore	  fiscal	  responsibility	  to	  government	  operations,	  likely	  needed	  something	  
that	   would	   restore	   its	   social	   democratic	   bone	   fides	   with	   its	   political	   base.	   	   The	   closure	   and	  
conversion	  of	  small	  rural	  facilities,	  whatever	  the	  wisdom	  of	  that	  decision,	  did	  further	  damage	  to	  
the	  government’s	   image.	   	  So,	   in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  growing	  concerns	  over	  the	  sustainability	  of	  
Canada’s	  health	  care	  system	  and	  the	  perceived	  threat	  that	  international	  economic	  liberalization	  
had	   for	   the	   future	  of	  Canada’s	   social	  union,	   it	  would	  have	  been	  hard-­‐pressed	   to	   find	  a	  better	  
way	   to	   reinforce	   its	   commitment	   to	   publicly	   financed	   and	   administered	   health	   care	   in	   the	  
province.	  	  And	  it	  did	  so	  in	  a	  fashion	  entirely	  consistent	  with	  the	  traditions	  of	  the	  Saskatchewan	  
NDP;	  there	  is	  no	  outright	  ban	  on	  private	  facilities,	  only	  the	  insistence	  that	  any	  private	  facility	  be	  
financed	   entirely	   privately	   and	   in	   a	  manner	   that	   does	   not	   undercut	   the	   operation	   of	   publicly	  
financed	   facilities.	   	   However,	   the	  Health	   Facilities	   Licensing	   Act	   was	   not	   picked	   up	   on	   a	   large	  
scale	  by	  the	  media	  or	  the	  public.	  	  So	  by	  flying	  largely	  under	  the	  public	  radar	  screen,	  the	  Act	  did	  
not	  create	  the	  rallying	  point	  that	  government	  could	  have	  been	  looking	  for.	  	  
What	  is	  perhaps	  most	  interesting	  about	  the	  legislation	  is	  that,	  with	  the	  possible	  exception	  of	  the	  
ophthalmology	   clinic	   that	  might	   have	   gone	   ahead	   in	   Saskatoon,	   the	  HFLA	  was	   almost	   entirely	  
pre-­‐emptive	   in	   nature.	   	   At	   that	   point	   in	   time	   the	   impact	   of	   the	   NAFTA	  was	   unclear,	   and	   the	  
potential	   market	   for	   private	   facilities	   in	   a	   province	   like	   Saskatchewan	   was	   extremely	   limited.	  	  
Yet,	  the	  government	  –	  in	  the	  form	  of	  key	  bureaucratic	  and	  political	  actors	  –	  acted	  very	  quickly	  to	  
forestall	  the	  development	  of	  private	  clinics.	   	  
As	  such,	   it	  appears	  that	  the	  key	  rationale	  for	  the	  HFLA	  was	  philosophical	  and	  political.	   	  Private	  
payment	   for	   publicly	   insured	   services	   was	   antithetical	   to	   the	   government’s	   world	   view	   and	  
certainly	  ran	  counter	  to	  its	  traditional	  uncompromising	  defense	  of	  medicare	  as	  one	  of	  the	  NDP’s	  
most	   important	   legacies.	   	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   there	   were	   clear	   political	   advantages	   to	   the	  
legislation	   as	   well.	   	   While	   the	   threat	   of	   wide-­‐scale	   proliferation	   of	   private	   facilities	   was	  
hypothetical	  at	  best,	  the	  legislation	  certainly	  allowed	  a	  government	  often	  criticized	  as	  much	  by	  
the	  left-­‐wing	  of	  its	  own	  party	  as	  by	  the	  right	  of	  centre	  opposition	  to	  shore	  up	  some	  of	  its	  political	  
base.	  	  The	  federal	  NDP	  had	  vociferously	  opposed	  the	  NAFTA	  and	  the	  prospect	  of	  legislation	  such	  
as	  Alberta’s	  Bill	   11	  was	   certainly	  heating	  up	   the	  debate	  over	   the	   role	  of	  private	  payment	   and	  
delivery	  of	  health	  services,	  such	  that	  the	  HFLA	  set	  the	  Romanow	  government	  up	  as	  a	  defender	  
of	  medicare,	  despite	  the	  significant	  cuts	  in	  the	  early	  1990s.	  
And	  while	  such	  political	  calculations	  can	  not	  be	  dismissed	  entirely,	  the	  legislation	  did	  in	  fact	  fill	  a	  
regulatory	  void	   that	  even	   the	   legislation’s	   critics	  admitted	  needed	   to	  be	   filled.	   	  Viewed	  within	  
the	  context	  of	  the	  Romanow	  government’s	  overall	  health	  reform	  agenda	  –	  the	  regionalization,	  
the	   ‘wellness’	   agenda,	   the	   restructuring	   of	   public	   facilities	   –	   the	   HFLA	   is	   consistent	   with	   the	  
government’s	   stated	   objectives	   of	  modernizing	  medicare.	   	  While	   critics	  would	   argue	   that	   the	  
HFLA	  in	  fact	  froze	  in	  place	  an	  out-­‐dated	  vision	  of	  health	  care	  delivery	  –	  one	  that	  needed	  to	  be	  
reformed	  with	  a	  greater	  reliance	  on	  private	  payment	  –	  the	  legislation	  served	  to	  fill	  a	  regulatory	  
gap	   that	   had	   been	   unanticipated	   decades	   earlier	   and	   did	   so	   in	   a	  manner	   consistent	  with	   the	  
stated	  vision	  of	  the	  province’s	  political	  leaders.	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  In	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  the	  journal’s	  anonymous	  reviewers	  provided	  a	  number	  
of	  important	  and	  helpful	  suggestions	  to	  strengthen	  the	  paper’s	  argument.	  
ii	   It	   is	   fair	   to	  say	   that	  much	  of	   the	  debate	  over	  public	  versus	  private	  delivery	  and	   finance	   in	  Canada	  has	  
been	  driven	  by	  the	  concern	  about	  the	  length	  of	  wait	  times	  in	  the	  public	  not-­‐for-­‐profit	  systems	  in	  the	  
provinces.	   	   To	   the	   extent	   that	   lengthy	  waits	   in	   the	   publicly	   administered	   system	  undermine	   public	  
confidence	   in	   that	   system,	   it	   provides	   an	   opening	   for	   those	   calling	   for	   greater	   levels	   of	   private	  
payment	  and	  for-­‐profit	  delivery	  (CHSRF,	  2005:	  McIntosh,	  2007;	  Armstong,	  2009)	  
iii	   In	  addition,	  a	  33rd	  health	  district	  was	  created	   in	  the	  far	  North	  of	  the	  province	  that	  was	   jointly	  funded	  
and	   administered	   by	   the	   province,	   the	   federal	   government	   and	   First	   Nations	   governments.	   	   Now	  
called	  the	  Athabasca	  Health	  Authority,	  it	  remains	  a	  unique	  experiment	  in	  tri-­‐partite	  collaboration	  for	  
the	  delivery	  of	  health	  services	  for	  populations	  that	  cross	  the	  federal-­‐provincial	  constitutional	  divide.	  
iv	   When	   the	   legislation	   was	   first	   introduced	   Saskatchewan	   had,	   as	   noted,	   32	   health	   districts.	   	   These	  
districts	  were	   amalgamated	   into	   12	   Regional	   Health	   Authorities	   in	   2001/02.	   	   The	  HFLA	   regulations	  
were	  amended	  to	  reflect	  this	  change	  in	  system	  governance.	  
v	   	   In	   1997,	   four	  members	   of	   each	   of	   these	   caucuses	  would	   leave	   their	   respective	   parties	   and	   form	   the	  
Saskatchewan	  Party	  which	  became	  the	  Official	  Opposition.	  
vi	   At	   the	   same	   time,	  one	  has	   to	   recognize	   that	   technology	  was	  driving	  much	  of	  what	  was	  happening	   in	  
terms	  of	  moving	  procedures	  out	  of	  hospitals	  or	   allowing	   them	   to	  be	  done	  on	  an	  out-­‐patient	  basis.	  	  
Improvements	  in	  technology	  and	  surgical	  procedures	  meant	  many	  procedures	  that	  once	  required	  full-­‐
fledged	  hospital	  environments	  could	  be	  done	   in	   smaller	   free-­‐standing	  surgical	   clinics	  and	  no	   longer	  
required	  significant	  post-­‐operative	  recovery	  in	  a	  hospital.	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